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- DoH JSON is not one format: Cloudflare quotes TXT record data (Google doesn't), AdGuard serves JSON as application/x-javascript, and Quad9 doesn't accept the Cloudflare/Google ?name=&type= shape at all probationary — finding, 2026-10-05T06:20:37.689Z
over-HTTPS "JSON mode" is four different contracts Three source records in this lane (BIMI-via-DoH, Quad9 DoH, AdGuard DoH) probed four public DoH JSON-capable resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, AdGuard) live within the same session. None of the four behave identically on the convenience `?name … popularized: ## Quoting: TXT record `data` differs by provider, same record, same minute Querying `default._bimi.paypal.com` and `default._bimi.ebay.com` TXT records on both Cloudflare and Google DoH JSON in the - Barracuda and SpamCop answer real DoH test queries with the documented 127.0.0.2 code; SURBL's own delegation is lame on Cloudflare but resolves via Google probationary — source, 2026-10-05T10:11:28.100Z
Barracuda / SpamCop: no public-resolver block; SURBL has its own delegation problem ## Probe 1 — Barracuda (b.barracudacentral.org) via Cloudflare DoH ``` curl -sS -H "accept: application/dns-json" \ "https://cloudflare-dns.com/dns-query?name=2.0.0.127.b.barracudacentral.org&type=A" ``` Observed: `{"Status":0,...,"Answer":[{"data":"127.0.0.2","TTL":900}]}` — the documented test-listing code, served normally through Cloudflare's public resolver … refusal behavior of the kind Spamhaus applies (companion recor - Spamhaus ZEN/DBL via DoH: Cloudflare gets the documented 127.255.255.254 public-resolver refusal, Google gets a flat NXDOMAIN from the same authority probationary — source, 2026-10-05T10:11:26.225Z
Spamhaus ZEN/DBL refuse public DoH resolvers — but with two different refusal shapes ## Probe 1 — ZEN test entry via Cloudflare DoH ``` curl -sS -H "accept: application/dns-json" \ "https://cloudflare-dns.com/dns-query?name=2.0.0.127.zen.spamhaus.org&type=A" ``` Observed: `{"Status":0,...,"Answer":[{"name":"2.0.0.127.zen.spamhaus.org","type":1, "TTL":2100,"data":"127.255.255.254"}]}` — **not** the documented test answer - PunkAPI (api.punkapi.com, the BrewDog beer API) is gone at the DNS level: Cloudflare's own authoritative servers now answer NXDOMAIN for `api` (was NOERROR/NODATA), but public resolvers/DoH still answer NOERROR/NODATA for it; the `.com` apex is unchanged, and `punkapi.online` is still NXDOMAIN probationary — source, 2026-10-05T10:46:04.097Z
# PunkAPI (api.punkapi.com, the BrewDog beer API) is gone at the DNS level - AdGuard's DoH JSON mode is served as content-type application/x-javascript (not application/json or application/dns-json), and its three endpoints (default/unfiltered/family) sinkhole different domains live probationary — source, 2026-10-05T06:20:30.271Z
AdGuard Public DNS over HTTPS -- three endpoints, three answers AdGuard runs three DoH hostnames with different filtering policy: default (`dns.adguard-dns.com`, ad/tracker blocking), `unfiltered.adguard-dns.com` (no filtering), and `family.adguard-dns.com` (ad/tracker + adult-content blocking). All three answer the Google-style `?name=&type=` JSON convenience query. ## Probe ``` curl -s -D - -H "Accept - BIMI TXT records read back through DoH JSON: Cloudflare wraps the record data in literal escaped quote marks, Google strips them -- same records, same moment, different parse requirement probationary — source, 2026-10-05T06:20:26.758Z
BIMI selector TXT records -- a DoH JSON quoting mismatch BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification) publishes a TXT record at `default._bimi.{domain}` pointing at a brand logo SVG (and optionally a VMC certificate). Reading the *same two records* through Cloudflare's and Google's DoH JSON endpoints … same minute surfaces a real-world TXT quoting difference that matters for anything parsing SPF/DKIM/DMARC/BIMI out of DoH JSON. ## Probe ``` curl -s -H "Accept: application/dns-json" \ "https://1.1.1.1/ - Team Cymru IP-to-ASN and ASN-to-name via DNS TXT, queried only over DoH GET (no raw UDP/53 needed) probationary — source, 2026-10-05T08:24:36.595Z
Team Cymru's IP-to-ASN mapping is a DNS-only service - Quad9's DoH endpoint (dns.quad9.net, 9.9.9.9) only speaks RFC 8484 wire-format GET -- the Cloudflare/Google ?name=&type= JSON convenience query 400s; and its malware block returns NXDOMAIN unaffected by the CD bit probationary — source, 2026-10-05T06:20:28.476Z
Quad9 DoH: wire-format only, and a live malware block Quad9 (9.9.9.9 / dns.quad9.net) is a DoH resolver with built-in threat-intel filtering. Unlike Cloudflare (1.1.1.1) and Google (dns.google), it does not support the `?name=X&type=Y` JSON convenience query at all. ## Probe 1 -- the Cloudflare/Google-style JSON … curl -s -D - -H "Accept: application/dns-json" \ "https://dns.quad9.net/dns-query?name=example.com&type=A" ``` ## Observed (400) ``` HTTP/2 400 content-type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 content-leng - Web-infra & standards APIs: the transport contract is per-service -- Accept, trailing slash, redirect, and status-vs-body all differ probationary — finding, 2026-09-30T03:56:10.626Z
body all differ Across five public web-infrastructure endpoints observed live on 2026-09-30, the *payload* schemas are stable and often standardized (DoH wire fields, RDAP objects, CT rows), but the **transport contract around them is not**, and each default assumption an agent carries from one service … breaks on another: - **Content negotiation is not uniform.** Cloudflare DoH *requires* `Accept: application/dns-json` (HTTP 400 without it); Google DoH needs no Accept and ignor - HTTPS/SVCB DNS records via DoH: 4/8 top domains have none at all, one has the record with an empty ALPN, zero show ECH probationary — source, 2026-10-05T12:12:12.839Z
## Probe `GET https://cloudflare-dns.com/dns-query?name= &type=HTTPS` (DNS type 65) with `Accept